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Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth 
Revisited: Theory and Evidence from a Recessionary 
Financial Market 
Jay B Kesten 
ABSTRACT 
Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? 
This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this 
question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary 
greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability, 
takeover frequency, and valuation of takeover premiums. The 
mainstream view, both of academics and market participants, is that 
entrenchment reduces accountability to shareholders and amplifies 
agency costs, thus decreasing shareholder wealth. Two influential studies 
(Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009) and Gompers, Ishii & Metrick 
(2003)) present empirical evidence consistent with this conclusion, 
finding statistically significant negative correlations between 
entrenchment and stock returns during the historic bull market of the 
1990s. However, there is no a priori reason to conclude that these effects 
will persist. Rather, a close examination of first principles suggests that 
the benefits attributable to the market for corporate control are 
substantially minimized during recessions. 
Testing this hypothesis using data from the recent economic crisis, 
this Article finds that the previously identified, statistically significant 
correlations between high entrenchment and negative stock returns 
disappeared entirely during the recent financial crisis, even for the most 
and least entrenched companies. In fact, the opposite effect was observed: 
firms with above-average levels of entrenchment outperformed less 
entrenched firms during the sample period. A portfolio buying firms 
with above-average entrenchment while simultaneously shorting firms 
with below-average entrenchment would have generated statistically 
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suggestions, discussions and critiques. The author would also like to thank Dori for her endless 
support, critical eye, and alternative point of view, and Riley for smiling. 
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significant annualized abnormal returns of 5.2%. Moreover, companies 
that entrenched themselves the most in the year prior to the current crisis 
outperformed companies that either reduced, maintained, or slightly 
increased their level of entrenchment. While correlation is not 
causation, these findings are consistent with the theory that there are 
significant costs, not just benefits, to exposing managers to an 
unfettered market for corporate control.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
2006 was a remarkable year for corporate America. Public 
companies reported record earnings,1 merger and acquisition activity 
reached unprecedented levels,2 and stock markets soared to new 
highs.3 Simultaneously, a chill wind swept across Wall Street as the 
first cracks appeared in the firmament of the economy, leading to the 
deepest recession and greatest economic crisis since the Great 
Depression. 
Another phenomenon emerged as well: the managers4 of U.S. 
public companies entrenched themselves—adopting governance 
structures that reduced their exposure to the threat of removal via a 
takeover—at an astounding rate. Between 1990 and 2005, 
managerial entrenchment levels had remained more or less stable.5 In 
2006, however, average entrenchment spiked nearly 50% as 
measured by an index of the six most impactful entrenchment 
devices: poison pills, staggered boards, executive golden parachutes, 
supermajority voting requirements for the approval of mergers, and 
limitations on shareholders’ ability to amend corporate bylaws and 
charters (collectively, the Entrenchment Index or “E-Index”).6 In 
 
 1. See, e.g., historical data for the S&P 500, http://www2.standardandpoors.com. 
 2. See, e.g., Dennis K. Berman, Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2006—Can 
M&A’s ‘Best of Times’ Get Better?—Private Equity Fuels A Frenzy of Deals, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 
2007, at R5. Indeed, both the absolute number of deals (11,750) and aggregate deal value 
($1.484 trillion) remain the highest to date. See FactSet MergerStat, M&A Activity: U.S. and 
U.S. Cross-Border Transactions, http://www.factset.com/data/data/factsetmergers 
(subscription required) (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 3. Historical data for various indices can be found at 
http://finance.yahoo.com/indices. 
 4. Unless otherwise noted, I employ “managers,” “management,” and related terms as 
shorthand for corporate fiduciaries, including directors, officers, and any other pertinent senior 
executives. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the roles or interests of directors on one 
hand, and executives on the other, are necessarily uniform or even aligned. See Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 
1741 (2006) (arguing that the two groups should not be conflated). 
 5. See Part IV.B.1, infra, for details of the entrenchment trends summarized here. 
Appendix B presents additional historical entrenchment data. 
 6. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate 
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 788–94, 813 (2009) [hereinafter BCF] (detailing the 
construction of the E-Index and finding that these six devices are highly correlated with 
negative stock returns during the 1990s). A working draft of this paper was circulated in 2004. 
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Farrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 
(John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion 
Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=593423.  
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all, more than three quarters of the firms sampled adopted at least 
one new entrenchment mechanism in the year prior to the economic 
crisis.7 Figure 1 illustrates this striking historical anomaly. 
 
 
This sea-change in overall managerial entrenchment raises a 
question debated vigorously by academics, courts, and legislatures 
for more than a quarter century: does managerial entrenchment—
i.e., the adoption of internal corporate devices to shield management 
from the effects of the market for corporate control—create or 
destroy shareholder value?  
The mainstream view, espoused by many academics and reflected 
in the behavior of market participants themselves, is that 
shareholders benefit substantially from the market for corporate 
control.8 Pursuant to the traditional law-and-economics model, any 
observable divergence from the optimal use of corporate resources is 
 
 7. Part IV, infra, describes the sample and selection process. 
 8. See infra Parts II.A & C. Indeed, to some extent, the very term “entrenchment,” 
which dominates the literature, pre-supposes an answer to the underlying question. Viewed 
more neutrally, however, takeoever defenses do not necessarily constitute entrenchment, in the 
negative sense, where they are adopted with a view to maximizing shareholder value, and 
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reflected in a public firm’s share price.9 Market participants have 
strong incentives to identify such underperforming firms, acquire 
control, remedy the firm’s managerial or operational deficiencies, 
and realize the resultant capital gain.10 Managers—operating in the 
shadow of a possible takeover—are thereby sensitized to market (i.e., 
shareholder) sentiment and incentivized to reduce agency costs and 
maximize shareholder value.11 Further, in the event of an actual 
change of control, ineffective management is replaced and 
shareholders of the target company receive substantial takeover 
premiums when tendering their shares.12 
Based on this theoretical framework, the market for corporate 
control is a powerful mechanism for holding management 
accountable to shareholder interests. Indeed, many legal scholars and 
economists argue that takeovers are the most important mechanism 
of corporate governance.13 Unsurprisingly, many commentators 
reason that entrenchment, by insulating managers from the 
disciplinary force of the market for corporate control and hindering 
actual changes of control in underperforming firms, reduces 
shareholder welfare.14  
 
 9. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965). 
 10. Id. at 113 (asserting that the market for corporate control constituted “one of the 
most important ‘get-rich-quick’ opportunities” of the time). 
 11. See id. at 112–13.  
 12. See infra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, 
PROMISES BROKEN 118 (2008) (asserting that “[t]he most important market-inspired 
component of the U.S. corporate governance infrastructure is the market for corporate 
control”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishney, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737, 756 (1997) (noting that “[t]akeovers are widely interpreted as the critical corporate 
governance mechanism in the United States . . .”). 
 14. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 13, at 120 (“[T]he genius of the market for corporate 
control as a corporate governance device is that it improves the quality of the corporate 
performance at all publicly held firms whose shares are ‘contestable.’”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 720 (2003) (arguing 
that “[w]hen managers have less to fear from takeovers, they fail to reduce costs and have 
poorer operating performance, including lower profit margins, return on equity, and sales 
growth”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management In Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1981) 
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel I] (“[A]ny strategy designed to prevent tender offers 
reduces welfare.”); Frank. H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in 
Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel II] (“The 
optimal level of regulation of tender offers . . . is zero.”).  
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This conclusion is not, however, unanimous. Other 
commentators argue that substantial costs arise from an unfettered 
market for corporate control, such as short-termism and skewed risk 
preferences, and that these costs can be mitigated by insulating 
management from the threat of takeovers.15 While most modern 
scholarship acknowledges this possibility, proponents of the market 
for corporate control as an important mechanism of corporate 
governance nevertheless conclude that, on balance, entrenchment 
destroys shareholder value.16 This understanding is also reflected in 
the behavior of market participants, who generally react negatively to 
news of managerial entrenchment and positively to announcements 
that such devices will be dismantled.17 Indeed, corporations that 
adopt entrenchment mechanisms are typically labeled as having 
“poor” corporate governance, in contrast to firms that abstain from 
implementing such measures.18 
Two recent, influential papers present empirical evidence 
consistent with this conventional model. In a seminal article, 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (“GIM”) ranked nearly 1,500 U.S. 
public companies on an index of twenty-four governance provisions 
related to shareholder rights and managerial entrenchment (the 
 
 15. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate 
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 205–14 (1991); 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 305 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A 
Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1145 (1984). 
 16. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 13, at 118 (“Clearly political theory, not economic 
theory, is required to explain the regulatory burdens that impede the market for corporate 
control.”); Bebchuk, supra note 14, at 720–21 (“Proponents of board veto have also argued 
that it might have beneficial effects ex ante . . . . [H]owever, there is currently no empirical 
support for the view that these conjectured effects are sufficiently significant to outweigh the 
adverse ex ante effects of board veto.”); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, 
Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 120–21 (1992) (“The empirical evidence is 
most consistent with value-maximizing, efficiency-based explanations of takeovers . . . . Yet the 
thrust of regulation is to thwart and burden takeovers, as if they were non-value-maximizing 
wealth transfers.”).  
 17. See notes 54–55, infra, and related text. 
 18. Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate 
Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1811–12 (2008) (“Firms that adopt devices 
to impede control changes are . . . conventionally characterized as firms with poor corporate 
governance, because the managers of those firms are not subject to the disciplining force of 
hostile bids. Correlatively, the absence of such devices is identified as a feature of good 
corporate governance.”). 
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Governance Index or “G-Index”).19 Using data from 1990 to 1999, 
GIM found that firms with the strongest shareholders rights 
outperformed firms with governance arrangements most favorable to 
management.20 Specifically, a portfolio which purchased the lowest 
decile (shareholder-friendly) of G-Index firms and simultaneously 
shorted the highest decile of G-Index firms would have generated 
statistically significant abnormal annualized returns of 8.5%.21 
In a subsequent study, Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (“BCF”) 
demonstrated that six governance devices—the E-Index provisions 
listed above—drove the entirety of GIM’s results; the other eighteen 
G-Index provisions had little residual explanatory power or statistical 
significance.22 Employing the E-Index factors alone, BCF reported a 
substantially more robust negative correlation between 
entrenchment and stock returns during the 1990s.23 Specifically, 
BCF describe a monotonic relationship between entrenchment and 
stock returns: each increase in E-Index level would have generated 
progressively lower returns.24 
In light of these findings, the recent surge of entrenchment 
appears difficult to justify in terms of management’s fiduciary 
obligations or the shareholder wealth maximization norm that 
animates those duties. Or, is it? To date, much of the debate 
concerning the market for corporate control takes for granted—
sometimes explicitly, but more often as an implicit assumption—that 
the net shareholder wealth-effect of the market for corporate control 
is monolithic.25 But, there is no a priori reason to assume that 
 
 19. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107 passim (2003). 
 20. Id. at 109. 
 21. Id. at 109, 121–25. GIM did not, however, find any statistically significant returns 
associated with portfolios that included firms outside the top and bottom 10% on the G-Index. 
“Abnormal” returns, in this context, refer to the return on a given portfolio that differs from 
the expected return of that portfolio based on a particular asset-pricing model. 
 22. BCF, supra note 6, at 822–23. 
 23. Id. at 814–17. By reducing the noise in the G-Index, BCF reported statistically 
significant results even when moderately entrenched firms clustered around the middle of the 
distribution were included in the portfolios. Id.  
 24. Id. at 813–14. 
 25. As to those critical of entrenchment, see the articles cited at note 16, supra. For an 
opposing, but similarly monolithic view, see Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s 
Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 105 (1979) (“[P]roscribing the ability of companies to defend 
against takeovers would adversely affect long-term planning and thereby jeopardize the 
economy, the policy considerations in favor of not jeopardizing the economy are so strong that 
not even a remote risk is acceptable.”). One notable exception in the theoretical literature is 
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governance outcomes remain constant over time.26 To the contrary, 
a close examination of first principles, as well as the empirical 
evidence to date, suggests that the net impact of managerial 
entrenchment depends on several exogenous factors that vary greatly 
with the macroeconomic climate.27 
In this Article, I present both theory and empirical evidence 
consistent with a more dynamic conception of the market for 
corporate control. Specifically, I argue that the benefits of the market 
for corporate control peak during times of strong economic growth, 
which are characterized, in the aggregate, by increased corporate 
profitability (along with associated potential for high agency cost) 
and markedly increased takeover frequency (along with associated 
takeover premiums for target shareholders). However, as the 
magnitude of these variables decrease, as is typical during 
recessions,28 so too do the benefits conferred by exposure to the 
market for corporate control. 
A testable hypothesis emerges from this theoretical framework: 
the strong, negative correlation between entrenchment and stock 
returns observed by GIM and BCF between 1990 and 1999—a 
period of historic economic growth—should dissipate during 
stagnant or recessionary economic conditions, such as the recent 
economic crisis. To the extent that the balance between the costs 
and benefits of the market for corporate control is close, the 
directionality of the relationship might invert as the costs of short-
termism and skewed risk preferences overtake the benefits 
attributable to increased accountability. Put differently, firms with 
higher entrenchment might outperform firms with lesser 
entrenchment during recessions. 
 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the 
Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984). Professor 
Coffee persuasively argued that individual takeovers might be either value-increasing or value-
decreasing, depending on firm-specific considerations. Id. at 1148–49. This Article extends 
that insight and presents the case that the benefits of the market for corporate control, in the 
aggregate, ebb and flow depending on macroeconomic factors. 
 26. Empirical studies tend to be more cautious in this regard, often noting that there is 
no certainty that the reported results will persist in future periods. See, e.g., BCF, supra note 6, 
at 786; Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 143–44.  
 27. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 28. Notes 87–90, infra, and related text, set forth descriptive statistics from the recent 
economic crisis. 
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Extending BCF’s E-Index methodology to the period from July 
2007 to December 2008, I find that the results are consistent with 
the hypothesis set forth above. First, as predicted, the statistically 
significant correlation identified by GIM and BCF disappeared 
entirely, even for the most and least entrenched companies. Second, 
I find the opposite effect in more moderately entrenched 
companies—firms with above-average levels of entrenchment 
generally outperformed less entrenched firms during the sample 
period. For example, a portfolio buying all firms with below-average 
entrenchment and selling short all firms with above-average 
entrenchment would have generated statistically significant negative 
abnormal returns. The significance of this result is robust to 
excluding the financial companies most directly impacted by the 
collapse of the real estate, sub-prime mortgage, asset-backed security, 
and credit-default swap markets. Third, historical entrenchment does 
not fully explain this correlation. In fact, a portfolio of companies 
that entrenched themselves the most in the year prior to the sample 
period would have generated positive annualized abnormal returns of 
2.8%. Ultimately, while correlation is not causation, these findings 
are consistent with a more dynamic theory of the market for 
corporate control. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys the 
theoretical and empirical literature concerning the benefits and costs 
of the market for corporate control, and the relationship between 
entrenchment and stock returns. Part III develops a more dynamic 
theory of the market for corporate control, which takes seriously the 
prospect that its benefits (reduction of agency costs and generation 
of takeover premiums for target shareholders) are substantially 
minimized during economic downturns. Part IV details the empirical 
analysis of the correlation between entrenchment and stock returns 
during the recent financial crisis. Part V summarizes and discusses 
the main findings, focusing on plausible explanations for these 
results. Part VI presents some concluding remarks. 
II. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL AND SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE TO DATE 
The market for corporate control sits at the intersection of two 
central debates in modern corporate law: the proper allocation of 
authority between shareholders and managers in public companies 
on one hand, and the most efficient way to regulate the conduct of 
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corporate fiduciaries on the other.29 As such, its regulation has 
attracted substantial academic, judicial, and legislative attention. The 
core question is simply stated: should shareholders have an 
unfettered right to receive and accept hostile tender offers, or is it 
desirable to insulate incumbent management (or allow them to 
insulate themselves) from this threat? 
In considering this important policy question, scholars have 
proffered theoretical models illustrating both substantial benefits and 
potentially significant costs associated with the market for corporate 
control. Arising from this literature are two important empirical 
questions. Do the identified benefits outweigh any concomitant 
costs? And if so, does this result persist independently of exogenous 
factors such as changing macroeconomic conditions? While the 
former issue has been debated exhaustively, the latter concern has 
received no serious treatment, despite the fact that the empirical 
evidence to date contains hints that the net effects of the market for 
corporate control vary over time. This Part briefly describes the main 
theoretical models of the market for corporate control, and then 
surveys the empirical evidence bearing on the relationship between 
entrenchment and shareholder welfare. 
A. Takeovers as Corporate Governance 
Many scholars assert that a vigorous market for corporate control 
performs a critical role in disciplining, monitoring, and replacing 
underperforming management teams, which neither intra-corporate 
constituencies (such as shareholders and boards of directors), nor 
courts can replicate easily or cheaply.30 Stemming from Henry 
 
 29. Collectively, these two issues subsume the majority of what is regularly termed 
“corporate governance.” See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Unentrapped, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
677, 680 (2009) (“Corporate law debates center on three overlapping topics: (1) the 
appropriate scope of regulation and the degree of reliance accorded state authority or, 
alternatively, private ordering, in organizing firms and solving problems; (2) the boundaries of 
the firm and the firm’s responsibility to outsiders; and (3) the terms of the corporate agency 
relationship and the allocation of authority within the firm.”). In making this statement, 
however, I offer no opinion on whether these issues should be the primary focus of modern 
corporate law. Similarly, for the purposes of this paper, I assume arguendo that the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm ought to guide corporate decision-making. 
 30. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 13, at 121; Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 14, at 
1170–73; Manne, supra note 9, at 113. By way of example, many commentators argue that 
neither shareholders nor directors are particularly effective corporate monitors due to collective 
action problems on the part of the former, and incentive/capture concerns as to the latter. As 
to collective action problems, see, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 389–400 (1986) 
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Manne’s seminal article, Mergers and the Market for Corporate 
Control, the standard law-and-economics model posits that control 
of a corporation is a valuable asset independent of either economies 
of scale or potential monopoly rents.31 Market participants thus 
 
(explaining rational apathy, collective action problems, and other related factors that drive 
shareholder passivity), and MACEY, supra note 13, at 131 (arguing that “[i]t would be highly 
irrational for individual investors to spend significant resources on corporate governance 
because the expected payoff any individual shareholder stands to gain from ensuring good 
management performance is so small in relation to the required investment”). For a discussion 
of board capture and other hurdles to effective corporate monitoring, see MACEY, supra note 
13, at 53–68. Moreover, while legal recourse—such as the derivative suit—can be effective 
with respect to various forms of self-dealing, the vast majority of potential “agency cost” cases 
challenging strategic business decisions would be dismissed at the pleadings stage by virtue of 
the protections afforded by the business judgment rule. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004); Einer R. 
Elhauge, Corporate Managers’ Operational Discretion to Sacrifice Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS 29 (Bruce Hay et al. eds., 2005) 
(commenting that “under the business judgment rule, courts are extraordinarily willing to 
sustain decisions that apparently sacrifice profits, at least in the short run, on the ground that 
they may conceivably maximize profits, at least in the long run”). Claims for shirking and/or 
failure to monitor are only slightly more viable, having famously been termed by former 
Delaware Chancellor William Allen as “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law 
upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” In re Caremark Int’l Inc. S’holder 
Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); accord In re Citigroup Inc. Sh. Derivative 
Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). For a detailed treatment of the development of the duty 
of oversight/failure to monitor claims, see Reinier Kraakman & Jay Kesten, The Story of Francis 
v. United Jersey Bank: When A Good Story Makes Bad Law, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 163–
93 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009). In any event, shareholder litigation is extraordinarily costly, 
and thus is only rarely in the best economic interests of either the shareholders in question or 
the corporation more generally. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 30, at 32–38 (arguing that 
shareholder litigation is a highly inefficient way of enforcing any profit maximization norm); 
Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park, & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder 
Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1736 (1994) (asserting that there are only limited circumstances 
where derivative suits increase corporate value); MACEY, supra note 13, at 130–54 (arguing 
that “[i]t is highly unlikely that shareholders would voluntarily agree to opt into an expensive 
private litigation system such as the one that exists in the United States that allows plaintiffs’ 
class action attorneys to extort billions of dollars from companies, and requires shareholders 
acquiesce in lawsuits in which massive amounts of money are transferred from one group of 
investors to another or, worse still, from investors to lawyers.”). 
 31. Manne, supra note 9, at 112; see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does 
Delaware Corporate Law Work?” 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1027 (1997) (“According to . . . 
the ‘free market’ view—tender offers were the great engine of managerial accountability and 
efficiency . . . . On this view, takeover entrepreneurs benefited shareholders and society as a 
whole by moving assets to their highest and best use, by disciplining bad managers, and paying 
premia to target shareholders.”). As the contours and implications of this model have been 
treated exhaustively elsewhere, a brief summary suffices for the purposes of this Article. For a 
representative sample of the literature on takeovers as a key mechanism of corporate 
governance, see MACEY, supra note 13, at 118–22; Coffee, supra note 15, 1199–220; Lucian 
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possess strong incentives to monitor and identify underperforming 
firms (as reflected by the company’s stock price), acquire control, 
remedy the firm’s managerial or operational deficiencies, and realize 
the resultant capital gain.32 The greater a firm’s market valuation 
diverges from its potential value under some other business strategy 
or resource allocation—especially relative to similarly situated 
companies in its industry or sector—the greater are the incentives for 
potential acquirors, thereby increasing the likelihood of a takeover.33 
Incumbent management is typically replaced in the event of a 
successful hostile takeover, leading to lost compensation (and other 
non-monetary benefits of their positions), personal disruption, and 
potentially reputational harm.34 As such, rationally-acting managers 
will seek to avoid having their firms taken over, especially in 
circumstances that suggest they failed at their respective tasks.35 
Given that hostile bids are typically forthcoming only if and when a 
firm is underpriced by the market relative to some alternative 
strategy or allocation of resources, incumbent managers have strong 
 
Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 
991–94 (2002); Easterbrook & Fischel I and II, supra note 14, passim; Romano, supra note 
16, at 129–33. 
 32. Manne, supra note 9, at 113 (asserting that the market for corporate control 
constituted “one of the most important ‘get-rich-quick’ opportunities” of the time). 
 33. The so-called “Wall Street Rule”—which posits that dissatisfied shareholders 
typically sell their shares rather than expend resources to change a corporation’s operations or 
governance—can amplify this effect. See Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: 
Voting Selling, and Limits on the Board’s Power to “Just Say No”, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1002 
(1999) (describing the “Wall Street Rule”). 
 34. See Romano, supra note 16, at 122–23 (surveying evidence showing that turnover is 
markedly higher in firms that undergo hostile takeovers, as compared to friendly mergers and 
companies in which there is no change of control). Courts, too, have long recognized this 
circumstance as one of the classic corporate conflicts of interest. As the Delaware Supreme 
Court famously opined, whenever a board takes steps to thwart an unsolicited takeover bid, 
there is an “omnipresent spectre that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests [i.e., 
to preserve incumbent managements’ jobs], rather than those of the corporation and its 
shareholders.” Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); accord 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
134 (2008) (remarking that unsolicited takeover bids are “[t]he paradigm[atic] conflict of 
interest”). 
 35. See Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6–7 (1983). Jensen and Ruback theorize this point 
rigorously, positing an alternative, but related, description of the market for corporate control 
in which managers themselves compete for the right to manage corporate resources. Id. Judge 
Richard Posner simply observes that “[n]o one likes to be fired, whether he is just a director or 
also an officer.” Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th  Cir. 1986), 
rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
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incentives to operate firms to their full potential, and thereby 
maximize shareholder value. 
Based on this theoretical framework, the market for corporate 
control creates shareholder value both directly and indirectly. First, 
in the event of an actual change of control, shareholders of target 
companies receive substantial acquisition premiums when tendering 
their shares.36 Second, and perhaps more importantly for the 
purposes of corporate governance, the market for corporate control 
deters agency costs systemically, even in the absence of an actual 
takeover bid, by holding managers accountable to market (i.e., 
shareholder) sentiment.37 Pursuant to this model, any regulation of 
the takeover market—including intra-corporate managerial 
entrenchment—interferes with these benefits.38 
 
 36. Several meta-studies posit differing estimates for average premiums. For example, 
Professor Macey reports that such premiums often amount to 50% of the target firm’s pre-bid 
share price. See MACEY, supra note 13, at 119 (citing Theodore Baums and Kenneth E. Scott, 
Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany, 17 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44, 59 (2005); Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: 
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 52 (1988)). In an earlier study, 
Jensen and Ruback suggest a more modest average premium of approximately 30%. Jensen & 
Ruback, supra note 35, at 4. Based on recent ThomsonOne data spanning 1990 to 2009, the 
average takeover premium for target companies trading on the NASDAQ and New York Stock 
Exchange was approximately 39%. Appendix E presents historical takeover premium data. 
 37. Some commentators argue that there are additional social benefits, in that the 
market for corporate control identifies and removes underperforming managers. See, e.g., 
Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 14, at 1169 (emphasizing the monitoring function of the 
takeover market). There is, however, no guarantee that removing certain managers actually 
improves corporate performance, or that the replacements are necessarily better managers than 
those removed. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 1159 (arguing that “the simple view that 
takeovers mean that good managements replace bad oversimplifies the more complex reality 
that corporate cultures are not easily changed, and abrupt efforts to do so may result more in 
demoralization than increased efficiency”). 
 38. See, e.g., the authorities cited supra notes 14, 16. This conclusion has even received 
limited endorsement by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 
643 (1982) (“[T]he effects of . . . block[ing] a tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are 
deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic 
resources to their highest valued use . . . is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism 
provides incumbent managers to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.”). It 
is also noteworthy that until recently, the conventional wisdom among both academics and 
market participants was that once a target was put “in play” by a hostile offer, it would 
generally be sold either to the initial bidder or to a white knight notwithstanding any takeover 
defenses in place. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The 
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
887, 901–02 & nn.50, 54 (2002). However, Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian demonstrate 
that certain takeover defenses substantially increase the chance that a target will remain 
independent in the face of a hostile bid. Id. at 929–31 (finding that effective staggered boards 
nearly double the likelihood of remaining independent in both the short-run (9 months) and 
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B. The Dark Side of the Market for Corporate Control? 
Opponents of hostile takeovers paint a starkly different picture of 
the market for corporate control. Gone is the benign, low cost/high 
efficacy monitoring and disciplining regime described above; in its 
place, a Schumpeterian whirlwind of creative destruction fueled by 
speculators, arbitrageurs and other corporate raiders.39 In his now 
famous manifesto, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, Martin 
Lipton asserted that the stakes were no less than the very fabric of 
the American economy:  
It would not be unfair to pose the policy issue as: Whether the long-
term interests of the nation’s corporate system and economy should be 
jeopardized in order to benefit speculators interested not in the vitality 
and continued existence of the business enterprise in which they have 
bought shares, but only in a quick profit on the sale of those shares? 
The overall health of the economy should not in the slightest 
degree be made subservient to the interests of certain shareholders 
in realizing a profit on a takeover.40 
Rhetoric aside, scholars have identified three main categories of 
plausible costs and diseconomies associated with an unfettered 
market for corporate control. The two most important for our 
purposes are behavioral. First, recalling that the market for corporate 
 
long-run (30 months) after an unsolicited bid). Moreover, at least as a matter of theory, the 
mere existence of any entrenchment mechanisms may deter some certain bids from being made 
at all. See Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 14, at 1177–80; Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra 
note 14, passim. Easterbrook & Fischel argue that the existence of takeover defenses is more 
likely to lead to an auction, in which subsequent players free-ride on the due diligence 
performed by the initial bidder. Insofar as these sunk costs (and related opportunity costs) are 
high, there is less incentive for outsiders to expend resources monitoring firms for 
underperformance in the first instance, and thus fewer initial bids will be made. Id. 
 39. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Takeovers in the Boardroom: 
Burke versus Schumpeter, 60 BUS. LAW. 1419 (2005); Rock, supra note 31, at 1027 
(“According to one view—the ‘managerialist’ view—hostile tender offers were bad for 
companies, communities, and society as a whole. From this perspective, the 1980s were a 
dangerous time, with sharks circling proud and once-proud companies, looking for any sign of 
weakness, and then moving in for the kill. In the process, enormous debt was incurred, 
companies were destroyed, assets sold off, the work of generations of expansion lost, and the 
nation mortgaged its future.”). 
 40. Lipton, supra note 25, at 104. Lipton’s critique also encompasses the possibility that 
heightened takeover activity creates substantial negative externalities beyond the interaction 
between shareholders and managers. Specifically, the disruption inherent in a vigorous takeover 
market could affect debt-holders, employees, customers, suppliers, and potentially even 
communities in which target firms are located. While I do not address this potential cost 
directly herein, it is certainly worth noting. 
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control monitors performance via stock price, managers who are fully 
exposed to the threat of takeovers may favor short-term projects or 
other endeavors geared primarily towards buoying the value of their 
firm’s shares, notwithstanding any long-term detriment to their 
company’s operations.41 While the prevalence and magnitude of 
“short-termism” has long been contested among academics,42 there 
is now a growing body of evidence suggesting that it is an 
economically meaningful trend amongst public companies. For 
example, in a recent study, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal identified 
two ubiquitous themes among public company management: (1) 
managers see an express trade-off between long-term value 
maximizing investment decisions and the short-term need to “deliver 
earnings”; and (2) managers believe that the market often overreacts 
to earnings missed.43 Based on interviews with more than 400 public 
company CFOs, Graham et al. report that 78% of the surveyed 
executives admitted to sacrificing long-term firm value in order to 
“smooth” earnings or hit analysts’ targets for a particular quarter.44 
It is reasonable to infer that these pressures described by Graham et 
al. may be amplified in firms where managers are exposed to the 
market for corporate control. 
A related concern is that, regardless of time horizon, the threat 
of takeovers may skew managers’ risk preferences. Specifically, 
managers operating in the shadow of the market for corporate 
control may rationally prefer higher-risk ventures or business 
strategies.45 This concern is particularly acute if competitors have 
 
 41. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 205–14.  
 42. Compare, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. 
POLIT. ECON. 61 (1988) (formally modeling the potential that the threat of takeovers leads to 
managerial short-termism), with Lucian A. Bebchuk & Lars Stole, Do Short-Term Managerial 
Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719 (1993) 
(arguing that the threat of unsolicited takeovers actually leads to excessive investment in long-
term projects). 
 43. John R. Graham et al. , The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 
40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5 (2005) (noting that “many executives feel that they are choosing 
the lesser evil by sacrificing long-term value to avoid short-term turmoil”). 
 44. Id. at 4–5. 
 45. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 1243 (arguing that “the greater danger involves a likely 
shift in managerial attitudes towards greater tolerance for risk”). Absent entrenchment devices, 
companies may also restructure their operations in potentially undesirably ways so as to make 
themselves less attractive as a takeover target. For example, managers may deplete their cash 
reserves, increase indebtedness, or acquire other companies for reasons wholly unrelated to 
long-term wealth creation. Id. at 1243–44. 
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elected to do the same because the market may punish firms that 
pursue conservative growth strategy if the dangers inherent in 
alternative high-risk strategies do not manifest themselves in the 
short term or are sufficiently opaque to outsiders. The empirical 
evidence on this point is circumstantial, but suggestive. For instance, 
in a multi-national study of bank performance during the economic 
crisis, Beltratti and Stulz found that banks with the most “pro-
shareholder” boards performed substantially worse than those with 
much less shareholder-friendly governance structures (including, but 
not limited to, entrenchment devices).46 They conclude that the 
most likely explanation is that “shareholder-friendly” banks “were 
pushed by their boards to maximize shareholder wealth before the 
crisis [and] took risks that were understood to create shareholder 
wealth, but were costly ex post because of the outcomes that were 
not expected when the risks were taken.”47 
Second, if managers are perpetually subjected to the threat of 
losing their jobs after any dip in the firm’s share price—whether 
warranted by a meaningful change in the company’s fundamental 
performance or not—they may invest fewer personal resources to 
develop the firm-specific skills necessary to maximize operational 
efficiency.48 This “demoralization cost” is not limited to executives, 
given the high rate of layoffs and uncertainty among lower-level 
 
 46. Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the 
Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation 3, 14–15 
(European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Finance, Paper No. 254/2009, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1433502.  
 47. Id. at 3. Beltratti and Stulz also acknowledge that the market can incorrectly assess 
risk, and may reward companies that generate high short-term gains, regardless of the potential 
long-term consequences associated with the strategy. Id. at 2, 21. Others have argued that 
incentives exist to take such risks even if potentially costly long-term outcomes were expected. 
See, e.g., DINO FALASCHETTI, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: 
HOW ACCOUNTABILITY CAN GO TOO FAR IN POLITICS, LAW, AND BUSINESS 87 (2009) 
(discussing the dangers of “tail risk” strategies in which financial managers, insurance 
companies or other firms “expose themselves to small chances of incurring large losses” and 
thus “appear to outperform the market . . . [o]ver short time-horizons.”); Sheila C. Bair, 
Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on the Causes 
and Current State of the Financial Crisis before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Jan. 
14, 2010), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjan1410.html 
(“Corporate sector practices also had the effect of distorting of decision-making away from 
long-term profitability and stability and toward short-term gains with insufficient regard for 
risk.”). 
 48. See Blair & Stout, supra note 15, at 304–09; FALASCHETTI, supra note 47, at 101–
13. 
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employees in the aftermath of a change of control.49 In sum, the 
threat of takeovers may impact the labor market, potentially making 
it more difficult (or at least more expensive) for companies with 
greater takeover exposure to hire and retain high-quality 
management and employees.50  
The third category is primarily epistemic. Due to informational 
asymmetries (coupled with various collective action problems 
endemic to dispersed shareholdings), target shareholders will rarely, 
if ever, be able to assess whether a tender offer is adequately priced.51 
Consequently, in the absence of a managerial stop-gap, public 
company shareholders can—and will—tender into undervalued bids, 
and thus facilitate inefficient transfers of control. Here, the benefit of 
entrenchment is that managers—who are not plagued by the 
epistemic and collective action problems faced by shareholders—can 
deploy (or rely on pre-existing) defensive measures in an effort to 
extract higher acquisition premiums through a negotiated 
transaction, or to block final bids deemed inadequate.52  
Each of these phenomena, which are by no means mutually 
exclusive, suggests that even if the market for corporate control 
confers substantial benefits on shareholders, there are attendant, 
non-trivial costs as well. Accordingly, the most accurate theoretical 
model of the market for corporate control must allow for an 
aggregate of both value-increasing and value-decreasing effects.53 
 
 49. See Coffee, supra note 15, at 1238–42 (summarizing the literature concerning 
takeovers, assimilation difficulties, and employee motivation).  
 50. Id. at 1234–38 (arguing that “the cost of attaining perfect competition in the 
market for corporate control is substantial impairment of the efficiency of the executive labor 
market”). 
 51. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning 
Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1452–53 (2005) (arguing that “director 
authority to fend off a hostile takeover bid can protect shareholders from their own ignorance 
in cases where an irrational market either undervalues the target’s stock, or overvalues the 
bidder’s”); Lipton, supra note 25, at 106–12. 
 52. In a series of classic takeover cases, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted this line of 
reasoning to approve various defensive strategies adopted by boards of target companies. See, 
e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153–54 (Del. 1989) (holding 
that the “inadequate value” of an all cash offer for all shares is a “legally cognizable threat,” to 
which target boards can respond by deploying defensive measures); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. 
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1383–85 (Del. 1995) (same, noting that shareholders might tender 
into an undervalued offer “in ignorance or based on a mistaken belief” concerning the value of 
their shares). 
 53. This conclusion is presented more rigorously in Part III, infra. Perhaps implicitly 
recognizing this dynamic, the current state of the law is largely permissive. While there are 
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The question that necessarily arises is this: which side of the ledger 
outweighs the other? The following sub-section surveys the empirical 
literature addressing this issue.  
C. The Empirical Evidence Thus Far 
Researchers have recently employed various empirical 
methodologies to assess the relationship between governance 
arrangements—including entrenchment devices—and shareholder 
wealth. With few exceptions, these studies find a negative correlation 
between entrenchment and several measures of firm performance, 
including stock price. However, as illustrated below, little attention 
has been paid to whether these effects change in differing 
macroeconomic environments. 
 One group of studies examines the impact of specific events on 
stock price. Numerous researchers find that shareholders enjoy 
substantial, positive abnormal returns when their companies actually 
receive a takeover bid.54 Other studies find a negative correlation 
between the adoption of various entrenchment mechanisms and firm 
value and/or stock returns. Faleye reports that announcing the 
adoption of a staggered board generates negative abnormal returns.55 
Similarly, Guo et al. find that announcing the dismantling of a 
staggered board generates positive abnormal returns.56 Collectively, 
these studies suggest that market participants generally view 
entrenchment as a value-decreasing phenomenon. 
 
certain widely-applicable regulatory constraints on the market for corporate control, courts 
have largely left the adoption of takeover defenses to the discretion of individual firms. For a 
more detailed discussion of this judicial balance, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 136–40.  
 54. MACEY, supra note 13, at 118 (“[S]tudies have found uniformly and unanimously 
that regardless of the time period or acquisitive form, there are statistically significant positive 
abnormal returns on the investments of shareholders in companies that receive takeover 
bids.”); see also ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 230 (1993) 
(reviewing empirical studies). What is less clear is whether any particular acquisition actually 
creates value in the aggregate, or simply redistributes wealth amongst participants. For 
example, the stock prices of public acquirors tend to decline on average, at least in the short 
term. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 9TH ED. 
905–06 (2008); Tim Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from 
Corporate Acquisitions, 52 J. FIN. 1765 (1997); P. Raghavendra Rau & Theo Vermaelen, 
Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 
223 (1998). 
 55. Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 83 
J. FIN. ECON. 501 (2007). 
 56. Re-Jin Guo, Timothy A. Kruse & Tom Nohel, Undoing the Powerful Anti-Takeover 
Force of Staggered Boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 274 (2008). 
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Another group of studies examines the impact of certain 
governance arrangements on various measures of firm performance 
over time. Some analyze individual governance provisions,57 while 
others attempt to create a more comprehensive framework via 
indexing several related devices. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(“GIM”) created an index of twenty-four corporate governance 
provisions (the “G-Index”) that allocate decision-making authority 
between shareholders and management (including many provisions 
related to the firm’s exposure to the market for corporate control).58 
After ranking approximately 1,500 companies on this scale and 
controlling for various factors, they found that firms with strong 
managerial protections (high G-Index scores) were less profitable 
and had lower sales growth than similarly situated firms with greater 
shareholder rights (low G-Index scores).59 GIM also found that 
during the 1990s, the share price of firms in the lowest decile of the 
G-Index (what they termed the “democracy portfolio”) 
outperformed firms in the highest decile of the G-Index (the 
“dictatorship portfolio”). In fact, an investment strategy based on 
buying the “democracy portfolio” while simultaneously shorting the 
“dictatorship portfolio” would have generated statistically significant 
abnormal returns of 8.5% per year during the 1990s.60 However, for 
firms nearer to the median of the G-Index, they found no statistically 
significant abnormal returns.61 
Refining GIM’s methodology, Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 
(“BCF”) demonstrated that six governance provisions (the “E-
Index”)—each directly related to the market for corporate control—
account almost entirely for GIM’s findings, and that the other 
 
 57. For example, both Cremers & Nair and Bebchuk & Cohen find that several 
governance provisions are negatively correlated with firm value (as approximated by Tobin’s 
Q). See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.  ECON. 
409 (2005); K. J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 
60 J. FIN. 2859 (2005). 
 58. GIM identify five categories of provisions: tactics for delaying hostile bidders, 
director/officer protections, other takeover defenses, limits on shareholder voting rights, and 
state laws. See Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 110–13. 
 59. Id. at 109–10, 119–29. 
 60. Id. at 109, 121–25. GIM also found that high G-Index had larger capital 
expenditures and were significantly more likely to acquire other firms, but enjoyed lower firm 
value, profits, and sales growth. GIM posit that one interpretation of their results is that “high-
G firms engaged in an unexpectedly large amount of inefficient investment during the 1990s.” 
Id. at 137; see also id. at 133–137. 
 61. Id. at 121–25. 
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eighteen G-Index factors were statistically insignificant.62 BCF’s 
findings are particularly relevant to this Article’s methodology and 
analysis. First, BCF found that the average monthly returns during 
the 1990s for portfolios of companies with the same E-Index scores 
dropped monotonically as entrenchment increased.63 Second, 
employing a regression analysis, they found highly significant, 
positive abnormal returns for portfolios taking a long position in less 
entrenched firms, and simultaneously shorting more entrenched 
firms.64 Unlike the GIM study, BCF found that these abnormal 
returns were statistically significant even when firms clustered around 
the middle of the distribution (i.e., firms with only moderate levels 
of entrenchment) were included in the portfolios.65 
Collectively, these findings are striking: variations in corporate 
governance structures—and managerial entrenchment in particular—
are highly correlated, both statistically and economically, with 
negative shareholder returns throughout the 1990s. There are, 
however, several hints in the existing literature that this correlation 
may not persist during periods with materially different 
macroeconomic conditions. GIM’s findings are confined to the 
1990s, a period of sustained and historic growth in the stock market. 
Subsequent work using a similar methodology and extending the 
sample size through 2001 (i.e., including the market downturn 
associated with the tech bubble collapse), however, found no such 
statistically significant correlation.66 Additionally, Beltratti and Stulz 
 
 62. BCF, supra note 6, at 822–23. 
 63. Id. at 813–14. 
 64. Id. at 814–17. BCF report that this correlation holds not only for the GIM sample 
period (1990–1999) but also the period spanning 1990–2003. Id. at 819–20. 
 65. Id. at 819–20. 
 66. See Cremers & Nair, supra note 57. There are, however, divergent opinions on how 
to interpret the Cremers & Nair results. Compare BCF, supra note 6, at 819 with Bhagat et al., 
supra note 18, at 1830–32. While BCF extended their sample to include data from 1990 to 
2003, two aspects of their expanded findings are noteworthy. First, their sample includes not 
only the bear market of 2000–2001, but also the period of recovery immediately thereafter. 
Second, comparing their results for 1990–1999 with their results for 1990–2003, there is a 
decrease in abnormal returns for 12 of their 20 portfolios, suggesting a reduction in the 
abnormal returns attributable to the period from 2000-2003. See BCF, supra note 6, at 816, 
820. A recent working paper by Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang lends further support to this 
intuition, reporting that neither the G-Index nor the E-Index is associated with abnormal 
returns during the period from 2000-2008, or in any four-year sub-period throughout that 
sample. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Learning and the 
Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns (John M. Olin Center for Law, 
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report that banks with the most shareholder-friendly corporate 
governance structures fared the worst during the recent economic 
crisis,67 but that the banks which performed worst during the recent 
recession had also generated the highest returns in the period 
immediately prior.68 
While these evidentiary fragments suggest that macroeconomic 
climate might play a meaningful role in the relationship between 
entrenchment and shareholder value, there has been no serious 
theoretical consideration of this possibility.69 The following sections 
present both theory and evidence that the net effects of the market 
for corporate control are indeed variable, and depend on factors 
closely linked to prevailing economic conditions. 
III. THE INHERENT VARIABILITY OF THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE 
CONTROL 
Why might the net wealth-effect of the market for corporate 
control change over time? One answer lies in the operation of the 
market for corporate control itself, and the mechanism by which it 
confers benefits on shareholders. As described in Part II, supra, there 
are likely both benefits (e.g., reduced agency costs, takeover 
premiums, and replacement of inefficient managers) and costs (e.g., 
short-termism, skewed risk preferences, “demoralization costs,” and 
the possibility of inefficient transfers of control) associated with 
exposure to the market for corporate control. One might 
approximate—albeit simplistically—the aggregate impact of the 
takeover market as follows: 
 
NSWmcc = {PRAC + Pprem + . . . + Ns-t + Nineff . . .} 
 
 
Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 667, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589731. 
 67. Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 46, at 3. 
 68. Id. at 2. 
 69. In fact, while the GIM and BCF studies have attracted substantial attention, the 
main thrust of most critics has been to question causality. See, e.g., John E. Core, Wayne R. 
Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An 
Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655 
(2006); Kenneth Lehn, Sukesh Patro, & Mengxin Zhao, Governance Indices and Valuation: 
Which Causes Which?, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 907 (2007). This important issue is addressed further 
in Part V, infra. 
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where the net shareholder wealth effect attributable to the market for 
corporate control (NSWmcc) is the sum of the reduced agency costs 
(PRAC), takeover premiums received (Pprem), etc., plus the sum of the 
effects of short-termism and other disruption in the boardroom (Ns-
t), losses attributable to inefficient acquisitions (Nineff), etc. In this 
model, P-elements create shareholder value, while N-elements 
generate countervailing negative effects.  
However, just as there is no way to know, a priori, whether 
NSWmcc is positive or negative, there is similarly no reason to believe 
that NSWmcc remains constant. In fact, a close examination of first 
principles suggests that the values of several of these elements might 
vary substantially depending on factors, such as the firm profitability 
and the relative volume/valuation of takeovers, which themselves 
vary depending on the economic climate. This section develops a 
more comprehensive, dynamic theory of the market for corporate 
control by considering how its net effects depend on these 
underlying macroeconomic factors. 
A. The Effects of Decreased Profitability 
As illustrated in Part II, supra, the takeover threat creates 
shareholder value by deterring managerial inefficiency and reducing 
agency costs. In order to understand how the magnitude of value-
creation might change over time, it is necessary to clarify what 
exactly is being deterred. Widely-held public companies, which are 
characterized by the separation of ownership and control, exemplify 
an agency relationship.70 Shareholders in these companies are almost 
uniformly passive investors who delegate authority over virtually 
every corporate decision to the board of directors, which in turn 
delegates much of the day-to-day management to the corporation’s 
officers and other senior executives.71 Notwithstanding the myriad 
 
 70. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66 (1932). Some commentators challenge the view that shareholders are 
in any meaningful way the “owners” of a corporation. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 800 
n.52 (2002) (arguing “[s]hareholders do not own the corporation” because “ownership is not 
a meaningful concept” in the nexus-of-contracts model of the corporation). These 
structural/philosophical concerns do not, however, negate the existence of agency costs or the 
mechanisms through which they can be minimized by the market for corporate control. 
 71. Indeed, this corporate structure is codified by statute as the default rule. See, e.g., 
Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under 
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be 
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benefits associated with this structure, costs inevitably arise where 
decision-making authority is delegated from principals (i.e., 
shareholders) to agents (i.e., managers).72 While these “agency costs” 
take a variety of forms, the category with which we are principally 
concerned here arises where the agents’ interests, and thus their use 
of corporate resources, diverge from those of their principals.73  
Shareholders’ primary—if not exclusive—interest is to maximize 
their returns.74 In a idealized world, managers, as fiduciaries, would 
never act in furtherance of their own interests to the detriment of 
their principals. However, in reality, managers can and do take 
actions which run contrary to the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm, from outright theft or fraud at one extreme, to shirking or 
inattention at the other. Between these two poles lies a vast universe 
of possible business decisions in which managers’ preferences differ 
from those of shareholders.75 Because many of the most extreme 
behaviors that lead to agency costs (such as theft, fraud, and self-
dealing) are heavily regulated by statutory, fiduciary, and even 
criminal regimes, one might reasonably expect that the additional 
 
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 72. For a classic treatment of agency costs in the corporate context, see Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 73. Jensen & Meckling term this set of costs the “residual loss.” Id. at 308. They 
identify other agency costs as: (1) monitoring costs borne by the principal, and (2) bonding 
costs borne by the agent. Id. In theory, the existence of, and exposure to, a vibrant market for 
corporate control might also minimize these monitoring and bonding costs, e.g., insofar as the 
threat of takeovers reduces the need for direct shareholder oversight. In practice, however, the 
magnitude of this effect is rather uncertain for two reasons. First, the market for corporate 
control is blind to managerial conduct that does not manifest in a reduced share price, such as 
fraud or other acts that artificially inflate a firm’s stock price. See MACEY, supra note 13, at 
119. Thus, exposure to the market for corporate control does not remove entirely the need for 
monitoring and/or bonding. Second, given the strong theoretical basis for rational shareholder 
apathy, see note 29, supra, especially for diversified investors, it is unclear how much 
monitoring cost is actually borne by the average public firm shareholder. 
 74. This statement is admittedly an oversimplification. Even as to purely financial 
matters, shareholders’ interests are not entirely uniform. For example, shareholders can differ 
greatly as to risk profile, investment horizon and/or tax circumstances. As a general matter, 
though, it is fair to say that virtually all investors would prefer that the value of their shares 
increases rather than decreases. 
 75. For example, managers may prefer more or less risky endeavors, differing 
distribution schemes (dividend vs. share buyback), capital structures (debt vs. equity), or 
growth strategies (organic vs. acquisition). In making any or all of these decisions, managers 
may be tempted to pursue a course of conduct that inures to their benefit, even if outcomes 
are not optimal for shareholders. 
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deterrence provided by the market for corporate control with respect 
to these issues is marginal.76 The takeover market is thus most 
effective at constraining behavior such as shirking, inattention, or 
inefficient allocation of resources. 
The latter is of particular note because it has long been theorized 
that free cash flow constitutes one of the major sources of agency 
costs within a firm.77 With respect to the the market for corporate 
control as a mechanism of corporate governance, it is useful to 
expand this conception to include profitability more generally. As 
companies generate profits in excess of their need to fund current, 
positive net-present-value projects (or service debt, etc.), managers 
are faced with a decision as to how the excess cash should be 
deployed. On one hand, it can be used to create shareholder value in 
the form of dividends, share repurchases, or investments in new 
wealth-creating projects. On the other, it might be diverted to create 
private benefits for managers via increased compensation, 
organizational inefficiency, “pet” investments near or below the cost 
of capital, or various other uses that fail to maximize shareholder 
value. For example, if senior executives perceive that they can 
command higher compensation by increasing the size of the firm 
under management, they may employ corporate resources to pursue 
costly empire-building acquisition strategies that fail to generate 
meaningful shareholder value.78 Viewed less cynically, agency costs 
 
 76. Moreover, the traditional theory rests upon a series of assumptions that poor 
performance is hard to hide in reasonably efficient capital markets. As illustrated vividly by 
Enron and Worldcom, though, many of the more egregious forms of misconduct involve 
artificially inflating a company’s value/stock price. The market for corporate control cannot 
detect this type of problem ex ante, and after the machinations are uncovered, it is often too 
late. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 13, at 119. 
 77. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 passim (1986); Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 133. 
 78. Some commentators argue that this very dynamic explains the wave of conglomerate 
mergers during the 1970s and 1980s, notwithstanding the questionable fiscal merit (and 
ultimate failure) of most of these diversification ventures. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 444 (2001) (asserting 
that “[t]he collapse of the conglomerate movement in the 1970s and 1980s . . . largely 
destroyed the normative appeal of the managerialist model. It is now the conventional wisdom 
that, when managers are given great discretion over corporate investment policies, they tend to 
serve disproportionately their own interests, however well-intentioned [they] may be”). Given 
that shareholders can diversify their own holdings much more easily and cheaply than can 
corporations, it is unclear whether these decisions are truly intended to benefit shareholders, or 
whether the primary impetus for increasing revenue via diversified acquisitions is instead closely 
tied to executive compensation packages. Cf. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 888–89 (citing 
diversification as a “dubious reason[] for mergers”). 
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may arise even where corporate strategy is shaped by non-pecuniary 
motives. For instance, managers’ decisions may be influenced by 
what they like (such as projects involving exploration, research and 
development, or acquisitions) even if those investments do not 
optimize corporate resources.79 
Pursuant to the classic model, the takeover threat serves to 
minimize these agency costs by incentivizing managers to refrain 
from diverting corporate assets, pay closer attention to corporate 
affairs, and scrutinize proposed projects carefully to determine 
whether they maximize shareholder value.80 By insulating managers 
from this disciplinary effect, entrenchment increases the likelihood 
that managers will misuse a firm’s excess cash flow.81 
As firm profitability decreases, however, managers are faced with 
fewer opportunities to divert value from shareholders. Moreover, as 
profits dwindle or the firm incurs losses, managers who would 
otherwise choose to co-opt private benefits during profitable periods 
might hesitate to do so for fear of jeopardizing the company’s 
operational viability.82 Put differently, as profitability declines within 
a firm, there is generally less potential agency cost for the takeover 
market to deter. Consider two firms, A and B, both of which 
generate $250 million in profits, above what is needed to fund 
current expenses, during year X. A and B are otherwise identical, 
except that A has adopted no entrenchment devices, whereas B 
employs several. Traditional theory holds that B’s managers will 
divert a greater proportion of this profitability to their own private 
benefit. All else being equal, the variance in firm value between A 
 
 79. See generally, Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35 (describing the prevalence of value-
negative projects in the oil industry in the early 1980s). Indeed, the touchstone of Delaware 
takeover jurisprudence— Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum— arose out of exactly this sort of strategic 
dispute between incumbent management and a hostile acquirer. 493 A.2d 946, passim (Del. 
1985); accord Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 78, at 444 (arguing that “[w]hile 
managerial firms may be in some ways more efficiently responsive to nonshareholder interests . 
. . the price paid in inefficiency of operations and excessive investment in low-value projects is 
now considered too great”). 
 80. See MACEY, supra note 13, at 118; Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra note 14, at 1168–
74. 
 81. This conclusion is bolstered by GIM’s findings and their proposition that high G-
Index firms “engaged in an unexpectedly large amount of inefficient investment.” See Gompers 
et al., supra note 19, at 136. 
 82. It is also possible that as a firm’s profits decrease, so does the prevalence of shirking 
among its fiduciaries, who might become more attentive for fear of being fired, bankruptcy, 
lawsuits, or the like. 
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and B could be as great as the $250 million plus the return on any 
portion invested in positive net present value projects. It follows, 
then, that if each firm generated only $2 million in profits, the 
potential divergence in firm value would be greatly reduced in most 
circumstances. Thus, assuming reasonably efficient markets, the stock 
price variance between these firms should similarly be reduced. In 
terms relevant to the discussion of entrenchment, the aggregate 
value of PRAC decreases as profitability decreases.  
B. The Effects of Decreased M&A Volume and Valuation 
The weight of empirical evidence demonstrates that shareholders 
of target companies reap significant—and immediate—capital gains 
from tendering into actual takeover bids.83 It follows that when: (1) 
M&A activity decreases and/or (2) valuation of target companies is 
less ambitious (i.e., lower premiums are paid), the benefits 
attributable to Pprem also decrease.
84 Ultimately, this relationship is 
controlled by the relative volume of M&A activity multiplied by the 
average premium received by target shareholders. 
It is less clear what impact, if any, decreased takeover activity has 
on the costs attributable to the market for corporate control. With 
respect to Nineff, as M&A activity decreases overall, it is likely that the 
number of inefficient takeovers (and thus Nineff) decreases as well. 
However, the magnitude of this effect depends on whether takeovers 
during downturns are more or less likely to be inefficient—from the 
perspective of target shareholders—than those consummated during 
boom periods. Furthermore, potentially offsetting this effect is the 
fact that high G-Index (and presumably high E-Index) firms are 
more likely to acquire companies.85 If, as seems likely, these 
acquisitions are also more likely to be value-negative than those 
pursued by less entrenched firms,86 then this inefficiency—from the 
 
 83. See supra notes 36, 54 and accompanying text. 
 84. It is also arguable—though highly speculative—that a substantial decrease in M&A 
volume relative to prior periods would reduce the perceived likelihood of the takeover threats, 
and thus reduce the effectiveness of the market for corporate control in mitigating agency 
costs. If so, one would expect the magnitude of deterrence to be most strongly reduced in low 
entrenchment companies (more highly entrenched companies already having insulated 
themselves to a greater or lesser extent from that threat), further minimizing the variations in 
stock valuation between companies of varying levels of entrenchment. 
 85. See Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 133–37. 
 86. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 77, at 328 (arguing that “managers of firms with 
unused borrowing power and large free cash flows are more likely to undertake low-benefit or 
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perspective of the acquiror’s shareholders—may also contribute 
meaningfully to the negative abnormal returns generated by 
entrenched companies during boom periods. The cumulative impact 
of these two factors (premiums to less entrenched companies and 
negative-value acquisitions by highly entrenched companies), is 
materially diminished as firm profitability decreases generally and 
fewer firms—including highly entrenched firms—are able to finance 
acquisitions.87 
Finally, the effects of decreased M&A activity on short-termism 
and managerial risk preferences (i.e., Ns-t) are similarly unclear. It is 
possible that a substantial decrease in takeover volume relative to 
prior periods would reduce the perceived likelihood of the takeover 
threat, and thus mitigate the pressures leading to over-investment in 
the short-term. This outcome seems unlikely, however, for at least 
three reasons. First, the in terrorem effect of takeovers might be so 
great that changes in the aggregate number of acquisitions have very 
little impact on managers’ risk preferences and investment horizons. 
Indeed, even during periods of surging M&A activity, the 
probability of being the subject of a takeover bid for any given 
company is quite low. This very concern might explain the explosion 
in entrenchment levels experienced during 2006, as M&A activity 
(and especially private equity transactions) reached a frenzied peak. 
Second, due to the volatility of the takeover market—and the 
economy in general—managers may be wary of trying to “time” the 
M&A cycle for fear of a takeover in the event of an unexpected 
recovery, even if deal flow has slowed significantly during a given 
span. Finally, the effects of short-termism are predominantly lagged, 
and thus any related costs manifesting during the sample period are 
likely attributable to operational decisions made in prior periods. 
 
even value-destroying mergers”); Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 136 (finding that high G-
Index firms “engaged in an unexpectedly large amount of inefficient investment” including 
acquisitions). 
 87. For example, Peter Galuszka reported that more than 1300 transactions were 
abandoned, primarily due to the lack of available credit, falling earnings and market volatility. 
Peter Galuszka, For M&A Activity, 2008 Was a Bust Year, BNET (Dec. 23, 2008), 
http://www.bnet.com/blog/ceo/for-m-a-activity-2008-was-a-bust-year/1587 (commenting 
that the M&A outlook for 2009 was questionable, given that “[n]ot many firms have a lot of 
cash”). 
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C. Recessionary Markets: A Hypothesis 
Based on the foregoing framework, the benefits of the market for 
corporate control, and particularly PRAC and Pprem, are greatest when: 
(1) firm profitability—and thus the associated potential agency 
cost—is high; and (2) the aggregate returns to target shareholders 
attributable to changes of control {M&A volume * average 
premium}—and consequently the associated premiums to 
shareholders of low entrenchment firms and negative abnormal 
returns to those of more entrenched firms—are high. Conversely, as 
the magnitude of (1) and/or (2) decrease, as is typical in recessions, 
there is a concomitant reduction in the P-element values. 
The recent economic crisis was characterized by substantial 
decreases in both of these factors. As to profitability, companies’ 
reported earnings dropped dramatically during the recent economic 
crisis. Indeed, the S&P 500 reported its first ever quarter of negative 
earnings per share (-$23.25) during 2008.88  
Moreover, takeover activity during 2007 and 2008 was markedly 
subdued as compared with the pace of M&A activity during the 
period examined by BCF and GIM.89 In 2007, 496 deals were 
consummated involving U.S. public company targets traded on the 
NASDAQ and NYSE; in 2008, there were 457.90 By contrast an 
average of nearly 800 such deals were consummated annually 
between 1990 and 1999. On average, premiums for 
NASDAQ/NYSE deals concluded during 2007 and 2008 (35.9% of 
share price on the day prior to announcement of the deal) were 
slightly lower than both the weighted mean premium observed from 
1990–1999 (41.2%), and over the entire span from 1990–2009 
 
 88. S&P 500 Index Earnings Data, STANDARD & POORS, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ home/en/us (follow “S&P 500” hyperlink under 
“Categories” and “Featured Indices” then expand “Download Index Data” and follow “Index 
Earnings” hyperlink) (free subscription required) (last visited Jan. 5, 2011); see also Kate 
Gibson, S&P Heads to First Quarter Ever of Negative Earnings, MarketWatch (Feb. 13, 2009), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-heads-first-quarterly-earnings-loss (noting six 
straight quarters of negative earnings growth). 
 89. The merger and acquisition volume and valuation data described in this Part is 
derived from the ThomsonONE M&A Deal Analysis database and detailed in Appendix E. 
 90. Overall public target M&A activity is comparable: 721 deals in 2007, 655 in 2008, 
as compared with an average of nearly 1200 annually from 1990 to 1999. See infra Appendix 
E. 
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(39.3%).91 Collectively, these data points suggest that the net returns 
to target shareholders attributable to M&A activity were, in relative 
terms, substantially diminished during the recent economic crisis.  
Based on the foregoing, and assuming that the decrease in P-
element costs is not completely offset by a similar decrease in N-
element costs,92 the model set forth herein predicts that that NSWmcc 
is highest during periods of strong economic growth (such as the 
1990s), but diminished during recessions. If the balance between P- 
and N-elements is close, one might even anticipate negative NSWmcc 
as the N-element costs overtake the P-element benefits in certain 
firms. This theoretical framework provides a testable hypothesis: the 
correlation between entrenchment and negative stock returns during 
the 1990s should dissipate (and might even reverse directionality) 
during recessionary periods. Part IV turns to empirical evidence from 
the recent economic crisis. 
IV. ENTRENCHMENT AND STOCK RETURNS—JULY 2007 TO 
DECEMBER 2008: DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND RESULTS 
To test the hypothesis set forth in Part III, this study adapts and 
extends the GIM/BCF methodology to determine the correlation 
between entrenchment and stock returns from July 2007 to 
December 2008.93 First, equal-weight portfolios were created by 
grouping together all firms with the same E-Index score.94 Then, 
three series of regressions were performed using these portfolios: (1) 
zero-investment portfolios were created by simultaneously shorting a 
high entrenchment grouping while going long on a less entrenched 
grouping (e.g., going long E0-1 while shorting E-6); (2) to control 
for certain industry-effects, the same regressions were run on 
industry-adjusted portfolios excluding the financial, real estate, and 
 
 91. See infra Appendix E. While it is notoriously difficult to assess takeover premiums 
accurately (note, e.g., the anomalous average premium during 1994), the figures employed 
herein are in line with those reported by other commentators. See, e.g., supra note 36. 
 92. The validity of this assumption, and in particular, the relative magnitude of each of 
these costs and benefits, certainly merits further research. 
 93. This sample period tracks the time-frames used in other studies examining corporate 
performance during the recent economic crisis. See, e.g., Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 46, at 6. 
The end of the sample period is also dictated in part by data availability. 
 94. For the purposes of statistical analysis, E-0 and E-1 are grouped together due to the 
exceptionally small number of E-0 observations during the sample period (6 in 2007, 4 in 
2008). BCF employed a similar grouping methodology with respect to the E-5 and E-6 firms 
in their study. See BCF, supra note 6, at 799. 
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insurance firms; and (3) regressions were run on standalone 
portfolios (e.g., E-4 by itself) to determine which of the E-Index 
cohorts account for the observed abnormal returns. Finally, given the 
surge in average entrenchment during the year prior to the 
beginning of the sample period, equal-weight portfolios were created 
by grouping together firms with similar changes in entrenchment 
during 2006 (-E). Regressions were run on these portfolios to 
assess the correlation between stock returns and -E. 
A. Data Sources and the E-Index 
Like BCF, this study employs a broad sample of U.S. public 
companies, whose corporate governance structures are detailed in 
the Corporate Takeover Defenses publication issued by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (“IRRC,” now part of RiskMetrics, 
which was recently acquired by MSCI, Inc.). The coverage universe 
consists of the “Super S&P 1,500” (which comprises the S&P 500, 
the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600), as well as 
various other firms selected on the basis of market capitalization and 
high institutional ownership levels.95 While there is some variation 
between volumes as to companies covered, each volume provides 
data for between 1,400 and 2,000 firms accounting for more than 
90% of the total U.S stock market capitalization.96 Following BCF, 
firms with dual class share structures and real estate investment trusts 
(i.e., firms with SIC Code 6798) were excluded, as both of these 
categories of companies have unique governance structures and 
entrenchment mechanisms.97 The remaining sample for the test 
period consists of 1,368 companies. 
Company financial information, including SIC codes, stock 
return data, and market capitalization information, was obtained 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices monthly data files 
and the Standard & Poor data collection. 
 
 95. See, e.g., Investor Responsibility Research Center, Corporate Takeover Defenses xi 
(2006). 
 96. See BCF, supra note 6, at 796; Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, supra note 66, at 7. 
IRRC volumes were published in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2006. More 
recent data is available via the Wharton Research Data Services, available at 
http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/. Each volume contains data current as of December 31 of 
the prior year. 
 97. BCF, supra note 6, at 797. 
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To calculate abnormal returns, the three Fama-French 
benchmark factors (MKTRF, HML, SMB) were employed along 
with a momentum factor (MOM).98 Each of these monthly data-
points was obtained from Professor French’s data library.99 Following 
both GIM and BCF, it was assumed that firms’ governance 
provisions—as reported in a particular IRRC/Riskmetrics volume—
remained in place throughout the period covered by that volume.100 
However, portfolio composition was adjusted as of January 2008 to 
reflect any changes in E-Index scores between the 2007 and 2008 
data. 
E-Index data was obtained from Professor Bebchuk’s data 
library.101 -E was derived by comparing E-Index data for companies 
covered in both the 2006 and 2007 IRRC/Riskmetrics volumes. 
This subset of the sample includes 1,088 companies. 
The E-Index tracks the level of structural entrenchment in a 
given firm.102 Each company is given an ordinal score (from 0 to 6) 
based on the presence or absence of six corporate governance 
structures: (1) a staggered board; (2) limits on shareholder bylaw 
amendment; (3) supermajority voting requirements for merger 
approval; (4) supermajority voting requirements for charter 
amendments; (5) poison pills; and (6) golden parachutes. The first 
four provisions are constitutional limitations on shareholder voting 
power. Staggered boards divide directors into several (typically three) 
classes, only one of which comes up for election in any given year. 
Consequently, shareholders cannot oust a majority of the incumbent 
management in a single vote, but must conduct—and win—two 
 
 98. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on 
Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993) for a description of the three Fama-French 
benchmarks, and Kenneth R. French, Details for Momentum Factor (Mom), 
DARTMOUTH.EDU, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_ 
Library/det_mom_factor.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) as to the momentum factor employed 
herein. For additional detail on the latter, see generally Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence In 
Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 passim (1997) (describing momentum effects). 
 99. Kenneth R. French, Data Library, DARTMOUTH.EDU,  http://mba.tuck. 
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 100. While this assumption is admittedly artificial, BCF report that using alternative 
“filling” methodologies do not alter their results. See BCF, supra note 6, at 796. 
 101. The E-Index data collections employed herein were obtained from Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk’s Data Library, in February 2009 (for 2007 vintage data) and again in January 2010 
(for 2008 vintage data). Lucian Arye Bebchuck, E-Index Data Collection, HARVARD.EDU, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
 102. See BCF, supra note 6, at 784–85, 788. 
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elections in sequential years. The three direct limits on shareholder 
voting (as to bylaws, charter amendments and merger approval) each 
enhance a target’s defenses by impeding shareholders’ ability to alter 
a firm’s existing defensive arrangements and/or approve a proposed 
change-of-control transaction. For example, to the extent that 
insiders (or shareholders friendly to management) control a 
meaningful, albeit not controlling, block of shares, they could 
potentially veto any such transaction.103  
The latter two provisions—poison pills and golden parachutes—
represent a target’s “takeover readiness.”104 Poison pills preclude, in 
practice, the acquisition of any significant (usually 5, 10 or 15%) 
block of shares on the open market, and thus create an exceptionally 
strong deterrent to both tender offers and attempted proxy contests 
to obtain control.105 Golden parachutes are executive compensation 
agreements that provide substantial pecuniary benefits in the event 
that executives are fired and/or demoted as a result of change-of-
control transactions, thus potentially marginalizing the deterrent 
effect of the takeover market.106  
 Collectively, the E-Index provisions proxy for managerial 
exposure to the market for corporate control. Low scores represent 
lesser, and high scores greater, insulation from its effects. As 
demonstrated by BCF, these six provisions fully drive GIM’s earlier 
findings concerning firm value and stock returns, with the remaining 
eighteen G-Index provisions providing little, if any, residual 
explanatory power.107 
 
 103. For examples of this phenomenon, see Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1380–84 (Del. 1995), and Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore 771 A.2d 293, 315–18 (Del. Ch. 
2000). Early studies also demonstrate the importance of voting rights to shareholders. See, e.g., 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395, 
407 (1983) (noting that classes of stock with stronger voting rights trade at a premium of two 
to four percent relative to other classes); accord Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 
651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon 
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”). 
 104. See BCF, supra note 6, at 790. 
 105. Id. at 792. 
 106. For an in-depth discussion of each of these provisions, see id. at 790–94. 
 107. Id. at 823–24. For a detailed description of how and why these six factors were 
selected, see id. at 788–95. 
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B. The E-Index and Stock Returns: July 2007 to December 2008 
1. Summary statistics—entrenchment 
Entrenchment increased at an unprecedented level throughout 
2006. While there had been only a slight upward trend in 
entrenchment levels between 1990 and 2005, average entrenchment 
increased drastically—from 2.5 to 3.7—by the end of 2006, and 
declined only slightly (to 3.5) through 2007.108 
BCF reported that as of 2002, entrenchment was more or less 
evenly distributed between firms with an E-Index of 3 or more, and 
firms with an E-Index of below 3. Based on 2007 and 2008 vintage 
data, this distribution has changed drastically, with more than 75% of 
firms at an E-Index of 3 or more throughout the sample period.109 
Comparing 2006 and 2007 data, only 54 of 1,088 firms (less than 
5%) reduced their E-Index level, 192 firms (17.6%) maintained their 
level of entrenchment, and 843 (77.4%) further entrenched 
themselves. Figure 2 illustrates the change in entrenchment (-E) 
between 2006 and 2007.  
 
 
 108.  While anecdotal evidence suggests that at least some of this surge in entrenchment is 
attributable to the contemporaneous flurry of takeover activity during 2005 and 2006, a 
rigorous inquiry into this question is beyond the scope of this Article, and certainly warrants 
further investigation. It is also worth noting that RiskMetrics made several changes to its data 
collection methodology when it acquired IRRC in 2007, including dropping some provisions 
from coverage and altering the definitions of certain others. All of the E-Index provisions 
remain in the coverage set, though the definition of golden parachutes was changed. Appendix 
A compares the IRRC (1990–2006) and Riskmetrics (2007 to date) definitions for each of E-
Index provisions. This change in methodology does not, however, seem to explain the steep 
rise in entrenchment, as the proportion of firms with golden parachutes declined between the 
two pertinent cohorts—nearly 78% of the 2006 coverage universe firms satisfied the golden 
parachute criteria as compared with only 52% in 2007. 
 109. Historic entrenchment data, derived from the E-Index data-set, is set forth in 
Appendix B. 
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As a basic robustness check—and consistent with BCF’s 
findings—there was no meaningful correlation between E-Index 
score and several potentially confounding variables, such as inclusion 
in the S&P 500 and market capitalization.110 There was a negligible 
correlation (Pearson’s r = -0.066) between the average entrenchment 
of firms included in the S&P 500 at the beginning of the sample 
period and those that were not. Likewise, there was no noteworthy 
correlation (Pearson’s r = -0.133) between E-Index score and firm 
size.111 
2. E-Index and stock returns: the baseline model 
Following GIM and BCF, abnormal returns were calculated by 
regressing the excess returns of the long/short portfolios described 
above for month t (Difft) on the three Fama-French zero-investment 
benchmark factors, along with a momentum factor: 
 
 110. Another plausible variable is incorporation in Delaware. But see Guhan 
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004) (finding 
that while firms incorporated in Delaware were worth 2–3% more than firms incorporated 
elsewhere between 1991–1996, that correlation has subsequently disappeared).  
 111. Though, as BCF report, the largest firms are, on average, somewhat less entrenched 
than any other category. BCF, supra note 6, at 799. Here, average entrenchment for the 30 
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Difft =  + b1 * MKTRFt + b2 * HMLt + b3 * SMBt + b4 * Momt+ et 
 
where MKTRFt is the month t value-weighted market return minus 
the risk-free rate, HMLt and SMBt are zero-investment benchmark 
factors representing book-to-market (high minus low) and size 
(small minus big) stock return effects for month t respectively, and 
Momt proxies for trailing year momentum effects for time t. In this 
regression, the variable  represents the abnormal monthly return of 
the long-short portfolio.112 
The results of these regressions starkly contrast with GIM and 
BCF’s findings from earlier periods. First, the statistically significant, 
negative correlation between entrenchment and stock price 
disappeared entirely during the sample period. In fact, the most 
extreme portfolio (going long E0-1 and shorting E-6), which 
generated the largest abnormal returns for both GIM and BCF, 
generated no abnormal returns at all during the sample period (1 
basis point monthly). Second, whereas BCF found that inclusion of 
firms towards the middle of the E-Index distribution generated 
monotonically declining, but positive, abnormal returns during the 
1990s, I find that similarly constructed portfolios would have 
generated modest negative returns during the sample period. Two of 
the four portfolios (E0-2/E4-6 and E0-3/E4-6) underperformed 
the benchmark factors at a 5% significance level.113 Figure 3 
illustrates these results. 
 
 112. See Fama & French, supra note 98, at 19–22; accord BCF, supra note 6, at 815. 
 113. Appendix C displays regression results for the long-short portfolios; Appendix D 
displays regression results for the standalone E-Index and -E portfolios discussed infra. 
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To explore this dynamic, regressions were run on each E-Index 
portfolio standing alone to determine which, if any, of the cohorts 
were driving the above returns. These results, too, diverge greatly 
from the monotonic relationship described by BCF. The E0-1, E2 
and E6 portfolios would have returned substantial negative abnormal 
returns (-5.5%, -2.6%, and -8.3% annualized, respectively). The E3 
and E5 portfolios both generated trivial negative abnormal returns 
(0.1% and 0.4% annualized, respectively). The E4 portfolio would 
have generated a positive abnormal return of more than 3.1% 
annualized. Figure 4 illustrates these results. 
 





































E0­1; E6 E0­1; E5­6 E0­2; E5­6 E0­2; E4­6 E0­3; E4­6
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C. E-Index and Stock Returns: Ex-Financial 
Given the nature of the recent crisis, it is possible that the 
findings described above are explained by period-specific returns 
attributable to the companies most directly affected by the collapse 
of the sub-prime mortgage market and related effects. To control for 
this possibility, each firm was coded according to its 4-digit SIC code 
into one of the 48 Fama-French industry classifications.114 The 
regressions detailed above were then re-run after excising financial 
companies (corresponding to the Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, 
and Trading industry classifications) from the portfolios as a proxy 
for the companies most directly affected by the unique circumstances 
of the financial crisis. Even excluding the returns attributable to this 
segment of the economy, the core findings described above, 
including directionality, remain unchanged, though the magnitude 
of abnormal returns is somewhat muted.115 The four moderate 
 
 114. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Industry Costs of Equity, 43 J. FIN. 
ECON. 153, 179–81 (1997) (listing categories by SIC codes). 
 115. Appendix C details these ex-financial results. BCF, employing a different control 
methodology, also report that their results are robust to industry-effects. BCF, supra note 6, at 
817–18. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/16/2011 12:55 PM 

































portfolios would still have generated negative abnormal returns, and 
the abnormal returns on the E0-3/E4-6 portfolio remain statistically 
significant, albeit at a 10% level. Ex-financials, the extreme portfolio 
(E0-1/E-6) would have generated positive, but not statistically 
significant, monthly abnormal returns of 36 basis points. 
D. E-Index and Stock Returns: -E 
How did the massive surge in entrenchment during 2006 
correlate with stock returns during the sample period? Standalone 
portfolios of firms that either reduced their level of entrenchment or 
increased it slightly would have generated trivial monthly abnormal 
returns (-6, 12, and 4 basis points for negative -E, 1 -E, and 2 -
E respectively). A portfolio of firms that did not alter their level of 
entrenchment would have generated modest, negative monthly 
abnormal returns (-34 basis points). Interestingly, a portfolio of the 
firms that entrenched themselves the most during 2006 (3 or more 
E-Index levels) would have generated modest positive monthly 
abnormal returns (23 basis points). None of these coefficients were 
statistically significant. Figure 5 illustrates -E results on an 
annualized basis. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
Three main findings emerge from this study. First, the highly 
significant negative correlation between entrenchment and stock 
returns identified by GIM and BCF disappeared entirely during the 
sample period. In fact, there were no statistically significant positive 
abnormal returns associated with any of the low-entrenchment 
portfolios, whether long/short or standalone.116 Similarly, there were 
no positive abnormal returns (significant or otherwise) associated 
with firms that decreased their level of entrenchment during the year 
prior to the sample period. In fact, a portfolio of negative -E firms 
would have produced abnormal, though not statistically significant 
losses. 
Second, contrary to the predictions of the traditional model of 
the market for corporate control, above-average entrenchment firms 
generally outperformed below-average entrenchment firms during 
the sample period. The extreme long/short portfolio (E0-1/E6) 
produced trivial abnormal returns, but all of the more moderate 
long/short portfolios produced economically meaningful (and in 
two cases statistically significant) negative abnormal returns. As 
demonstrated by the ex-financial regressions, these results are not 
explained fully by the unique circumstances of financial sector firms. 
While the performance of the financials impacted the magnitude of 
abnormal returns to some degree, the trend identified above clearly 
extended to the market as a whole given the persistent negative 
returns attributable to four of the five portfolios, and the continued 
statistical significance of the returns attributable to the E0-3/E4-6 
portfolio. 
The results from the standalone E-Index portfolio regressions 
further illustrate that companies with moderate, above-average 
entrenchment fared the best during the sample period. The strongest 
individual cohort was the E4 portfolio, followed by the E3 and E5 
portfolios. Returns dropped off sharply for firms closer to both ends 
of the E-Index distribution. Particularly notable are the E0-1 and E6 
portfolios, which would both have generated substantial negative 
annualized abnormal returns (-5.5% and -8.3% respectively). 
 
 116.  In this respect, my findings are consist with those of Bebchuk, Cohen & Wang, 
supra note 66, who report that the positive abnormal returns associated with the E-Index 
during the 1990s disappear during the period from 2000–2008. 
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Third, all portfolios of firms that entrenched during 2006 
generated positive abnormal returns, while those that reduced 
entrenchment or maintained their level of entrenchment generated 
negative abnormal returns. In fact, a portfolio of firms that 
entrenched themselves the most during 2006 would have generated 
the largest positive abnormal returns (2.8% annualized) of any -E 
cohort, while firms that did not alter their level of entrenchment 
fared the worst (-4.0% annualized abnormal returns). It is unclear 
how much weight should be attributed to the -E findings, however, 
given the lack of statistical significance. 
How are these results best explained? While there is no 
consensus about how to interpret the abnormal returns identified by 
GIM and BCF (and herein),117 there are several potential 
explanations. One possibility is the hypothesis and theoretical 
framework set forth above in Parts II and III. As predicted, the 
positive abnormal returns attributable to low-entrenchment firms 
disappeared during the sample period. Moreover, given equal-
weighting, as in the long/short portfolios, above-average 
entrenchment firms outperformed companies with below-average 
entrenchment. The standalone portfolios provide further evidence 
consistent with the theory that the N-element costs, such as short-
termism and/or skewed risk preferences, are economically 
meaningful, and manifest to the greatest degree in the least 
entrenched companies, which no longer enjoy large offsetting 
benefits attributable to the P-elements in the equation. Firms that 
were moderately shielded from the effects of the market for 
corporate control (i.e., the E3, E4 and E5 portfolios) outperformed 
those with the greatest exposure (E0-1 and E2) to that market. 
Tellingly, both the E0-1 and E2 portfolios would have generated 
economically significant negative abnormal returns. 
These results are also consistent with the notion that the balance 
between the benefits and costs of the market for corporate control is 
fragile. In particular, while the most extreme long/short portfolio 
would have generated no abnormal returns (or small, positive returns 
ex-financials), once firms towards the mean of the E-Index 
distribution were included in the portfolios, the abnormal returns 
became negative and statistically significant.  
 
 117. See BCF, supra note 6, at 812. 
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The E6 cohort might seem to diverge from the theoretical 
framework set forth herein, but this is not a surprising result. Firms 
that employ all six of the strongest entrenchment mechanisms have 
removed themselves almost entirely from the market for corporate 
control, and thus receive none of its disciplinary benefits. The theory 
set forth above posits that the benefits attributable to the market for 
corporate control are minimized during recessions, but not that they 
are reduced to zero. Whereas moderate levels of entrenchment may 
strike a balance between costs and benefits, full entrenchment—and 
associated agency cost—is likely to tilt that balance regardless of the 
prevailing economic climate, especially if the fully-entrenched 
condition has persisted for any length of time. This explanation is 
bolstered at least in part by the -E regression results. More than 
half of the firms in the E6 cohort at the beginning of the sample 
period are also in the 3+ -E portfolio, which would have generated 
positive abnormal returns. Therefore, it appears that the substantial 
negative abnormal returns attributable to the E6 cohort are driven 
primarily by firms that had maintained a fully entrenched governance 
structure for at least several years, as opposed to firms that had 
entrenched themselves substantially during 2006. 
There are, however, several other possible explanations that must 
be considered. Given the relatively narrow sample period, these 
results may be a statistical or economic anomaly. There might also be 
a correlation between the E-Index factors and a common risk factor 
that is, as yet, omitted from the standard asset pricing benchmarks.118 
While there is other evidence consistent with this study’s findings,119 
one important avenue for future research is to test, more rigorously, 
the variable effects theory set forth herein employing a longer sample 
period, correlating the performance of similarly situated firms across 
various market conditions, and testing whether this pattern holds for 
 
 118. See, e.g., BCF, supra note 6, at 812. Similarly, there could be a hidden variable that 
explains the abnormal returns. See Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 139–42. For example, 
extremely large companies tend to be, on average, much less entrenched than smaller 
companies. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. As BCF note, one of the reasons for this reduced 
level of entrenchment is that these companies are unlikely to be the subject of takeover bids 
purely because of their enormous market capitalization. See BCF, supra note 6, at 799–800. In 
accordance with the theoretical framework set out in Part III, as the imminence of the takeover 
threat is minimized, the salutary impact of the market for corporate control is also reduced. 
Thus, while the largest firms may occupy lower than average levels of the E-Index, they may 
not generate the expected positive abnormal returns that prior studies have attributed to low-
entrenchment companies.    
 119. See supra notes 13–14, and accompanying text. 
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earlier market downturns and whether it has continued explanatory 
power during periods of economic stagnation.  
Perhaps more importantly, correlation does not necessarily 
indicate causation. Indeed, the causal arrow may point in the 
opposite direction.120 While this question has been debated 
vigorously as to the GIM and BCF findings, the causation-related 
critiques levied against those studies do not seem to have to the same 
force in the context presented herein. First, as Beltratti and Stulz 
argue, econometric studies are often riddled with concerns about 
endogeneity, but such concerns are less troubling in the instant case 
because it is highly unlikely that most market participants could have 
anticipated the depth and breadth of the economic crisis (to the 
extent that they anticipated a downturn at all) or its potential effects 
on their firms.121 
Second, the reverse-causation narrative employed to challenge 
the GIM and BCF findings seems inapposite to the results described 
here. To date, the crux of the causation debate is whether high 
entrenchment causes future underperformance, or whether managers 
of low-value firms (or who expect poor future performance ex ante) 
entrench themselves prophylactically to reduce the likelihood of a 
takeover.122 This explanation makes little sense when inverted: why 
would managers expecting strong future performance entrench 
themselves or remain entrenched? Thus, while causality cannot be 
inferred with any certainty from these results, the traditional reverse-
causation hypothesis does not appear to have much explanatory 
power.123 Of course, this raises an important question for further 
 
 120. See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 69, at 655; Lehn et al., supra note 69, at 907; BCF, 
supra note 6, at 823. 
 121. See Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 46, at 4. The authors reach this conclusion even as 
to the banking sector—arguably one of the few industries in a legitimate position to gauge the 
impact of the coming storm. As illustrated above, however, the findings in this study extend to 
the broader market, which presumably had less information concerning the likely magnitude of 
the financial crisis. 
 122. See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 69, at 656; Gompers et al., supra note 19, at 137–
39; Lehn et al., supra note 69, at 908. 
       123. One plausible explanation, consistent with both the standard reverse-causation 
narrative and the cost-component of the NSWmcc equation presented herein, is that managers 
simply got it wrong: firms that had been underperforming their peers did not expect to 
outperform their peers and entrenched themselves as a result of the massive surge in M&A 
activity during the period prior to the financial crisis. But, these companies collectively 
performed better during the financial crisis due, perhaps, to their more conservative business 
strategies or long-term investment horizons made possible by reduced exposure to the market 
for corporate control. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/16/2011 12:55 PM 
1609 Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited 
 1651 
investigation: why did previously entrenched firms, or those that 
entrenched immediately prior to the sample period, perform better? 
While this Article’s findings are suggestive, they cannot conclusively 
answer the question. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article examines the correlation between managerial 
entrenchment and stock returns during the economic crisis of 2007–
2008. Unlike earlier studies, which found highly significant, negative 
correlations between high entrenchment and returns during the 
1990s, more entrenched firms fared better in the aggregate than less 
entrenched companies during the sample period. In fact, the best 
performing group of firms was that with moderate, above-average 
levels of entrenchment. Further, firms that entrenched the most 
during the year immediately prior to the sample period 
outperformed firms that decreased their level of entrenchment or 
maintained a consistent level of entrenchment throughout. 
The findings presented are largely consistent with the theoretical 
framework developed herein, in which the net impact of the market 
for corporate control is a balance of costs and benefits, and varies 
depending on macroeconomic climate. Specifically, one should 
expect that the benefits of the takeover threat are minimized during 
recessions, and thus the correlation between low entrenchment 
companies and positive abnormal returns observed during periods of 
strong economic growth should be weakened. These findings also 
suggest that this balance is fragile, and that the costs could, for some 
companies, outweigh the benefits. While the results of this study do 
not (and cannot) prove the theory set forth herein, they present 
preliminary evidence that while the market for corporate control 
provides a measure of managerial accountability, its net wealth-
effects can vary, and that less entrenchment is not necessarily 
correlated with increased shareholder value during all periods. 
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APPENDIX A: E-INDEX DEFINITIONS 
IRRC Governance Definitions (1990–2006) 
 
Classified board or Staggered board: 
A board of directors, divided, for the purpose of election, into 
separate classes. In most instances there are three classes, with the 
directors in each class serving overlapping three-year terms. 
Staggering directors’ terms makes it more difficult for dissidents to 
seize control of a target company immediately, even if they control a 
majority of the company’s stock, since only one-third of the directors 
stand for election in any one year. With a classified board, also 
known as a staggered board, the shareholders’ ability to affect the 
makeup of the board is limited because it would take at least two 
elections to replace a majority of the board. 
 
Golden Parachute: 
A severance agreement/contract between a company and an 
executive contingent on a change in corporate control.  
 
Poison Pill: 
Shareholder rights plans are among the more complicated anti-
takeover devices. Although their terms and conditions vary 
considerably, the purpose of a poison pill is to force potential bidders 
to negotiate with a target company’s board of directors. If the board 
approves the deal, it may redeem the pill. If the board does not 
approve a bid and the potential acquirer proceeds anyway, the pill 
would be “triggered,” causing actions that would make the target 
financially unattractive or dilute the voting power of the potential 
acquirer. Under a typical plan, shareholders are issued rights to 
purchase stock in their own company or in the acquiring company at 
a steep discount (usually half price) if a hostile bidder acquires a 
certain percentage (usually 15% or 20%) of the outstanding shares. 
Unlike anti-takeover charter and bylaw amendments, poison pills do 
not have to be ratified by shareholders.  
 
Supermajority vote requirement: 
A vote that requires support from more than a majority of the shares 
entitled to vote. Supermajority provisions establish shareholder vote 
requirements that are higher than the minimum levels set by state 
DO NOT DELETE 2/16/2011 12:55 PM 
1609 Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited 
 1653 
law to approve a merger or other business combination. They 
typically require the approval of the holders of two-thirds, 75% or 
80% or more of the outstanding shares for actions that otherwise 
would require simple majority approval. 
 
Source: IRRC Governance Definitions (1990–2006), Wharton Research 
Data Services, http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/ 
_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/_115RiskMetrics/Overview%20of%20
IRRC%20Legacy%20Governance%20Database%20on%20WRDS.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2011). 
 
RiskMetrics Governance Definitions (2007–Present) 
 
Classified board or Staggered board:  
A board of directors, divided, for the purpose of election, into 
separate classes. In most instances there are three classes, with the 
directors in each class serving overlapping three-year terms. 
Staggering directors’ terms makes it more difficult for dissidents to 
seize control of a target company immediately, even if they control a 
majority of the company’s stock, since only one-third of the directors 
stand for election in any one year. With a classified board, also 
known as a staggered board, the shareholders’ ability to affect the 
makeup of the board is limited because it would take at least two 
elections to replace a majority of the board. 
 
Golden Parachute:  
A severance agreement/contract between a company and an 
executive contingent on a change in corporate control. [Note that 
data in this field may be inconsistent for the 2006 through 2008 
data years; in some cases “Yes” indicate that an NEO at the company 
has such a contract but in other cases “Yes” indicates that an NEO at 
the company has a contract that provide for a cash severance 
payment > 3X salary + bonus].  
 
Poison Pill:  
Shareholder rights plans are among the more complicated anti-
takeover devices. Although their terms and conditions vary 
considerably, the purpose of a poison pill is to force potential bidders 
to negotiate with a target company’s board of directors. If the board 
approves the deal, it may redeem the pill. If the board does not 
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approve a bid and the potential acquirer proceeds anyway, the pill 
would be “triggered,” causing actions that would make the target 
financially unattractive or dilute the voting power of the potential 
acquirer. Under a typical plan, shareholders are issued rights to 
purchase stock in their own company or in the acquiring company at 
a steep discount (usually half price) if a hostile bidder acquires a 
certain percentage (usually 15% or 20%) of the outstanding shares. 
Unlike anti-takeover charter and bylaw amendments, poison pills do 
not have to be ratified by shareholders.  
 
Supermajority vote requirement:  
A vote that requires support from more than a majority of the shares 
entitled to vote. Supermajority provisions establish shareholder vote 
requirements that are higher than the minimum levels set by state 
law to approve a merger or other business combination. They 
typically require the approval of the holders of two-thirds, 75% or 
80% or more of the outstanding shares for actions that otherwise 
would require simple majority approval.  
 
Source: Risk Metrics Governance Definitions (2007–Present), WHARTON 
RESEARCH DATA SERVICES, http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
support/Data/_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/_115RiskMetrics/Risk
Metrics%20Governance%20Definitions.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). 
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APPENDIX B: HISTORICAL ENTRENCHMENT DATA 
Historic Entrenchment Data (Ex. Dual Class Firms)
 
Year Average Entrenchment E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 
1990 2.229 181 249 328 342 197 50 9 
1993 2.324 149 236 336 341 220 56 5 
1995 2.310 151 243 350 346 228 52 3 
1998 2.273 181 328 439 430 271 48 10 
2000 2.452 125 297 409 459 305 64 10 
2002 2.498 120 255 446 457 308 75 7 
2004 2.549 104 257 468 515 337 71 7 
2006 2.505 90 294 453 482 327 62 4 
2007 3.667 6 51 188 413 379 299 95 
2008 3.485 4 52 245 415 332 253 61 
 
 
Source: Entrenchment data is derived from Lucian A. Bebchuk, E-Index 
Data Collection, HARVARD.EDU, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ 
bebchuk/data.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). 
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APPENDIX C: MONTHLY ABNORMAL RETURNS  
Long/Short Portfolios (July 2007 – December 2008) 
 
Long/Short Portfolio  Baseline Model Ex-Financial 
      
E-Index 0-1 / E-Index 6 0.01 0.36
   (0.374) (0.500) 
E-Index 0-1 / E-Index 5-6 -0.52  -0.27 
 (0.411) (0.613) 
E-Index 0-1-2 / E-Index 5-6 -0.32 -0.19
   (0.333) (0.465) 
E-Index 0-1-2 / E-Index 4-5-6 -0.58*** -0.32 
 (0.251) (0.298) 
E-Index 0-1-2-3 / Index 4-5-6 -0.44*** -0.34** 
   (0.169) (0.189) 
 
This table illustrates the monthly abnormal returns for various long-
short portfolios derived from the E-Index data-set. Both the baseline 
and ex-financial models regress excess returns from each long-short 
portfolio on the three Fama-French factors—which benchmark 
market, firm size, and book-to-market effects—along with a 
momentum factor (each of which was obtained from Ken French’s 
data library). The ex-financial portfolios exclude firms classified as 
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, and Trading according to the 
Fama-French 48 category industry classification. See E. Fama & K. 
French, Industry Costs of Equity, 43 J. Fin. Ec. 153, 179–181 
(1997) (listing categories by SIC codes). All portfolios were 
constructed using equal-weightings of each component. Portfolios 
were adjusted in January 2008 to account for E-Index changes 
between 2007 and 2008 data. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, and significance at the 15%, 10%,  and 5% is indicated 
by *, **, and *** respectively. 
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APPENDIX D: MONTHLY ABNORMAL RETURNS  
Standalone E-Index and E Portfolios  





      
Negative ΔE -0.06 
(0.472) 
0 ΔE -0.34 
(0.226) 
1 ΔE  0.12 
(0.191) 
2 ΔE 0.04 
(0.191) 















This table illustrates the monthly abnormal returns for various 
standalone E-Index and ΔE portfolios derived from the 2006, 2007 
and 2008 E-Index data-sets. Returns were calculated as above, 
pursuant to the baseline model (see Appendix C, supra), except that 
ΔE portfolio composition remained constant throughout the sample 
period. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and significance 
at the 15%, 10% and 5% levels is indicated by *, **, and *** 
respectively. 
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APPENDIX E: ANNUAL MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEAL VOLUME 
AND VALUATION 
U.S. Public Company Targets – NYSE and NASDAQ 
(1999-2008) 










1990 639 1003 21.13 
1991 531 859 25.5 
1992 539 843 17.84 
1993 594 922 28.83 
1994 863 1301 169.61 
1995 1002 1456 31.18 
1996 1093 1641 16.16 
1997 927 1327 23.32 
1998 918 1323 23.56 
1999 875 1231 41.84 
2000 839 1189 31.59 
2001 616 858 37.06 
2002 405 605 29.69 
2003 385 572 54.39 
2004 354 517 22.2 
2005 327 510 59.63 
2006 391 570 22.99 
2007 496 721 26.42 
2008 457 655 46.19 
N 12251 18103  
    
Mean  
(Entire Period) 645 953 38.38 
Mean (2007-2008) 477 688 36.31 
Mean (1990-1999) 798 1191 39.90 
Weighted Mean 
(Entire Period)   39.33 
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Weighted Mean 
(2007-2008)   35.90 
Weighted Mean 
(1990-1999)   41.21 
    
Source: Data derived from the ThomsonONE M&A Deal Analysis 
database, ThomsonOne.com, https://www.thomsonone.com (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2011) filtering for: Target Nation (United States); Target Public 
Status (Public); and where applicable Target Primary Stock Exchange by 
Country (NASDAQ or New York). Deal activity is categorized by year 
based on the date a merger or acquisition becomes 
effective/unconditional. Deal premiums are calculated by comparing the 
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